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ABSTRACT

A common problem encountered during patent prosecution is a restriction
requirement. According to In re Doyle, the failure to assert linking claims that read
on non-elected claims is an error correctable by reissue. This paper argues that the
Doyle court was correct in holding that Doyle was distinguishable from In re Orita.
Allowance of genus claims that link previously non-elected claims comports with the
patent statute. As the public is on notice that patent claims may be broadened
within two years, the Doyle holding ensures that the patentee is given the full
breadth of protection necessary to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts." Patentees are advised to review patents issued in the last two years where the
patent application was subject to a restriction requirement and a divisional
application was not filed. A reissue may be granted for genus claims that would
cover some of the originally non-elected claims.
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STAKE YOUR (LINKING) CLAIM: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF INREDOYLE ON PATENT

REISSUE
GRACE C. Y. LEUNG*

[Tihe public knows, or should know, that an issued patent can be broadened
by reissue during a two-year period following issuance. The public is
therefore on notice that at least some matter can be 'dedicated to the public'
in error, and that the error, if caught in time, can be corrected by reissue.1

INTRODUCTION
In a top-secret, private laboratory operating under a clever guise of a law school
journal office, a scientist discovers some compounds. 2 In filling out her application
for a patent, she writes out a specification and broad claims for the compounds
covering four species: 3 c1, c2, c3, and c4. The examiner for the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") subjects the claims to a restriction requirement:
Group I of "protein compounds" must include cl and c2 and Group II of "organic
compounds" must include c3 and c4. The inventor amends her claim to elect only
Group I and cancels c3 and c4. The patent for Group I issues but the inventor
declines to file a divisional application. Later, without doing anything else, will she
be able to get a broadening reissue for claims that link the subject matter from the
issued patent and the non-elected claims?
The short answer, according to In re Doyle4, is yes because a failure to assert
5
linking claims that read on non-elected claims is an error correctable by reissue.
The complexity of the patent laws dealing with making corrections to a patent after it
has been properly granted is four-fold: the patentee must consider prior art, the scope
of the claims in the original patent granted, the error itself and whether it is a

*J.D. Candidate, June 2004, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois, H.B.Sc. Univ.of
Toronto, Canada, 2001. The author is grateful to RIPL for the editorial assistance. She extends
special thanks to A.K. for her editorial prowess, P.D. for his encouragement, and the Leung family
for their love and support.
I In re Doyle, 293 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
2 The idea for this hypothetical was derived from an article written by Linda E. Alcorn and

Teresa U. Medler, The Johnson & Johnson Case, PartIT: A'rguing Against Dedicated to the Pubhlic,'
8 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 6 (June 2002).
3 See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 12.03[3] (2002) (describing the genus-species
relationship as it applies to restriction requirements). In patent law, "genus" claims are broad
claims encompassing a multiple embodiments of the invention. Id. In contrast, "species" claims are
narrower claims, generally a singular embodiment of a variable. Id.
4 293 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). Reissues are granted where the issued patent is "wholely or
partially inoperative or invalid ...." Id. Furthermore, note that if the rejection of the claims in the
original patent had been due to prior art rather than a restriction requirement, the "recapture rule"
would apply, and the patentee would be barred from reissuing the non-elected claims after
deliberately surrendering them during prosecution in order to obtain her patent. See U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1412.02 (8th ed., 2001)
(hereinafter "MPEP').
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"fixable" error, and the post-issue method of correction that is best suited to correct
the error.
In Doyle, the Federal Circuit allowed a reissue with broadening genus claims
that linked prior non-elected species claims. 6 This article analyzes the Federal
Circuit's decision in Doyle and offers suggestions on how to ameliorate the reissue
process. Part I traces the history of reissue in the Patent Act and the case law
leading up to Doyle. Part II analyzes Doyle and considers the impact of the Doyle
decision on the future of patent law. Part III proposes several statutory changes in
light of issues raised by Doyle and in conjunction with policy arguments that have
been made by the legal community in the past few decades.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Issue as a Post-GrantRevision of a Patent
7
The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws related to patents.
Patent applications are reviewed and examined by the PTO to ensure the
requirements of Title 35 of the United States Code are met, and patents are granted
to those inventions that, among other requirements, are "useful,"8 novel, 9 and nonobvious 10 with respect to prior art. 11 For each patent application, the patentee
provides a written description 12 of the invention in what is known as the
"specification," concluding with "one or more claims particularly pointing out and
13
distinctly claiming the subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention."
Despite numerous checks and balances, errors in the application may still find
their way into issued patents. Four types of post-grant revisions of patents are

6 See Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1358-59.
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o promote the

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
8 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). As part of the limitation on the congressional purpose of enacting
patent laws, the Patent Act thus echos the phrase "useful Arts" in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
10 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
11 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant
is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor").
12 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process for making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

d.
13

Id.
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available to patent holders: disclaimer, 14 certificate of correction, 15 reexamination, 16
and reissue. 17 This comment focuses on the last method, reissue.
Patent reissues are largely controlled by Sections 25118 and 25219 of the Patent
Act. For a fee, and on the surrender of the original patent, the Director of the PTO
may reissue a patent for the unexpired time from the original patent if the original
patent is "wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, due to a defective specification or
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to
claim in the patent.... '"2O However, the application for reissue must not be based on
an error "made with deceptive intention," as a reissued patent will not be granted
even if the patent is deemed inoperative or invalid where fraud is involved. 21 Upon a
reissue grant, the patent holder will again have the right to exclude all others from
22
practicing the same invention for the rest of the valid term.

B. The Development of Reissue in The PatentAct

1 History ofReissue
While no statutory provisions existed in the eighteenth century to permit
corrections to issued patents,2 3 in 1825, the Secretary of State issued a new patent to
Joseph Grant for the rest of the original patent's term when he surrendered his
original patent due to its "defective specification." 24 The Supreme Court would
25
uphold the patent reissue in Grant v. Raymond. Later, the Patent Acts of 1832,26

14 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2000) (explaining that a substantive disclaimer cancels invalid claims of the
original patent while a terminal disclaimer allows the remaining term of a patent to be disclaimed
or dedicated to the public so that public is no longer excluded from the manufacture, use or sale of
the invention).
51Patentees may use certificates of correction to make changes under 35 U.S.C. § 254 (2000),
for PTO errors, 35 U.S.C. § 255 (2000), for clerical or typographical errors, and 35 U.S.C. § 256
(2000), for errors in who is named an inventor.
16 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2000). For a critical look at the reexamination system, see Mark D.
Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S.
PatentLaw, 11 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997).
17In addition to correcting claims or disclosures, reissues may also be used to claim an earlier
priority date based on a co-pending United States application or a foreign application. See MPEP,
supra note 5, § 1402.
18 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
19 35 U.s.c. § 252 (2000).
20 35 U.S.C. § 251
1.
21 Id.
22 35 U.S.C. § 251.
23 See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 15.02.
24 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 222 (1832). The patent was for a "winding machine
for setting up hat bodies." Id.
25 Id.
The court in Grant reasoned that "[i]f the mistake should be committed in the
department of state, no one would say that it ought not to be corrected .... Why should not the
same step be taken for the same purpose, if the mistake has been innocently committed by the
inventor himself?" Id. at 242.
26 Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559.
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1836,27 and 187028 codified the authority of patent officials to reissue patents for the
same invention when mistakes or inadvertent errors made without fraud were found
30
in issued patents. 29 The reissued patent was valid for the rest of the original term.
It was not until the Act of 187031 that "new matter" 32 was expressly barred from
reissue applications.
Until Topliff v. ToplifP3 was handed down by the Supreme Court in 1892,
reissue applications to better clarify or correct the written description were common,
but applications to broaden the scope of the original description were rarely
successful. 34 The main problem associated with broadening issued patents through
reissue was the effect of the new patent on the public. The world outside the PTO
would have known only of the original patent and, consequently, may have made
investments and used resources that did not infringe under the original patent but
nonetheless violated the claims of the reissued patent.

ii InterveningRights
The courts struggled to reconcile the rights of the patentee and the rights of the
public. 35 In the 1915 decision Autopiano Co. v. American Player Action Co.,3 6 the
Second Circuit broke new ground as the first court 37 to protect an accused infringer
from the effects of a reissued patent. 38 Ultimately, in Sontag Chain Stores v.
National Nut Co. of Cal.,3 9 the Supreme Court held that an alleged infringer who is
27 Act

of July 4, 1836, ch. 162.
of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 53, 16 Stat. 198.
29 See CHISUM, supra note 3, § 15.02.
30 Jd
28 Act

'31SeeAct of July 8, 1870,
32 CHISUM, supra note 3,

supra note 28, at 198.
§ 15.02. "New matter" is a term of art and a historical limitation in
patent reissue applications that is still present in statutory law today. Id. New substantive matter
that would belong in a separate patent application should not be included in a reissue application.
Id.
33

145 U.S. 156 (1892).

'3 Id. at 171 (discussing the right of the patentee to get a reissue); see also CHISUM, supra note
3, § 15.02[5].
35 For a discussion of "fairness" in the way Congress wrote the Patent Act and how the Courts
construe patent law, see Georgia E. Kralovic, The Principleof FairNotice: Is It Prudent Guidance
For the Future ofPatentLaw 26 PEPP. L. REV. 89 (1999).
36 222 F. 276 (2d Cir. 1915).
'37See Paul M. Janicke, When Patents Are Broadened Midstream:A Compromise Solution to
Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 30 (1997).
38 222 F. 276 (1915).
In Autopiano, the plaintiff surrendered his original patent for player
pianos for a first reissue with narrower claims. Id. at 280. After the reissue was granted, he then
applied for a second reissue that broadened the claims and effectively returned the patent to its
original wording. Id. The court held that the defendant, who had manufactured pianos in the
interim between the two reissues, was not liable for infringement on estoppel grounds. Id. at 282;
see also CHISUM, supra note 3, § 15.02[6] (discussing intervening rights in the context of the
development of reissue patents).
31 310 U.S. 281 (1940). The decision in Sontag settled 25 years of inconsistent holdings that
followed Autopiano, but left unresolved was the reasoning for the award of intervening rights. See
Janicke, supra note 37, at 33. At the present time, the rights under reissue as found under 35
U.S.C. § 252 (2001) also apply to reexamination situations. See MPEP,supra note 5, § 2293 (2001).

[2:360 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

unaware of the original patent and uses a machine after the original patent has
issued, but before the reissue application for a broader claim is filed, has intervening
rights 40 that would bar injunctive relief against a continued use of the invention.

iii. Complicating the Criteria
While the Sontag Chain Stores decision provided some guidance, case law still
showed a lack of consistency on what type of broadening reissues could be granted.
The sole requirement was that applications for broadening reissues must be made
within two years of the original patent issue. 4 1 Two years later, in U.S. Industrial
ChemieaNs, Inc. v. Carbide Carbon Chemicals Corp.,42 the Supreme Court set forth a

more definite test for determining if the broadening reissue was properly granted.
The court explained that "[ilt must appear from the face of the instrument that what
is covered by the reissue was intended to have been covered and secured by the
43

original"

An early interpretation of error for the purposes of patent reissue was any
"inadvertence, accident, or mistake." 44 Although this interpretational standard still

4035 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). See generally,P. J. Federico, InterveningRights in Patent Reissues,
30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603-637 (1962). For a more recent perspective on how reissue procedure
might be changed so that the doctrine of equivalents would be abolished, and equitable intervening
rights would be strongly promoted, see Jonathan A. Platt, ProteetingRelianeeon the PatentSystem:
The Economics and Equities of Intervening Rights, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (1997). Platt
offers three possible remedies to the competitor of a reissued patent holder: (1) allowance of limited
post-issue infringement after reissue; (2) a right to royalty-free future infringement; and (3) forced
licensing of the patent. Id. at 1069-73.
41 See Janicke, supra note 37, at 33 (citing Sontag, 310 U.S. at 283-84 and cases therein). The
two-year statute of limitation was later codified in 35 U.S.C. § 251 4(2000).
42

315 U.S. 668 (1942).

43 Id. at 676 (emphasis added) (elaborating on the "same invention" requirements from Parker

& Whipple Co. v. Yale Cloak Co., 123 U.S. 87, 99 (1887)); see also Flower v. Detroit, 127 U.S. 563,
571 (1888)). See generally CHISUM, supra note 3, § 15.02[8][d] (discussing the history of the "same
invention" requirement). It may appear that "face value" is a valued aspect of claim drafting; a
contradictory point of note lies in the doctrine of equivalents where one can show infringement if the
accused infringing device is substantially similar to the claim. Although the Supreme Court held in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25 (1997), that the doctrine of
equivalents was valid and rejected the argument that it contravenes the reissue process, the
Supreme Court greatly limited the effects of the doctrine of equivalents in Festo Corp v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabus-hiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). Thus, Federal Circuit Judge Helen Nies' dissent
in Warner-Jenkinson, where she remarked that "[tlhe patentee is much better off evading the
reissue procedure which Congress has provided, and resorting to its counterpart, the doctrine of
equivalents, created out of the judiciary's sense of 'fairness'[]", Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (1995), no longer is as persuasive as it was at the time.
41 The exception of "deceptive" intention was also paired with "fraudulent" intention in section
64 of former Title 35 and is well established by case law. See R.S. § 4916; Act of May 24, 1928, ch.
730, 45 Stat. 732; see also In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 1280 n. 6 (C.C.P.A 1977) (demonstrating that
cases continue to follow the historical equitable estoppel principles, citing In re Cornell, 150 F.2d
702 (Ct. Cust. App. 1945), and In re Smyser, 135 F.2d 747 (Ct. Cust. App. 1943)); In re Wesseler, 367
F.2d 838, 834, (C.C.P.A. 1966) (explaining that "Congress did not intend to alter the test of
'inadvertence, accident, or mistake' established in relation to the pre- 1952 [Patent Act] rules").
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remains in court decisions, the wording is not found in the current statutes, and only
45
"deceptive intentions" remain.

C The Supreme Courtand FederalCircuitDecisionsBefore In re Doyle
In the early decades of patent drafting, the courts used claims solely for
determining novelty. 46 During the nineteenth century, however, claims evolved into
the basis of determining infringement. 47 Two years before the 1952 Patent Act, the
Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.48
quite succinctly stated that "[if accused matter falls clearly within the claim,
49
infringement is made out and that is the end of it."
While the claims determine the scope of the invention, this does not resolve the
matter. Both the courts and Congress recognized that the careful drafting of claims
might nonetheless result in errors in the final issued patent; 50 thus, certain errors
made in the claims could be corrected through reissue. 51 However, the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") denied the patent reissue applicants
52
this option in In re Orita.

45 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). For an inoperative or invalid patent to qualify for reissue, the
error at issue must not have been made with "deceptive intention." Id. The MPEP,supra note 5, §
1448 (emphasis added), explains that while there is an "[e]xamining" of whether there is a lack of
deceptive intent for reexamination purposes for reissue applications at the PTO, there is no actual
"investigationof fraud, inequitable conduct, or duty of disclosure issues." Rather, the applicant's
statement of lack of deceptive intent in the reissue oath as required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (1997) is
taken as dispositive. Id. The exceptions that may lead to an investigation include "an admission or
judicial determination of fraud, inequitable conduct, or violation of the duty of disclosure." Id.
46 Janicke, supra note 37, at 39 n.126, (citing Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of US.
Patents, 20 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 134, 147, 488 (1938)).
47 Id.
48 339

49

U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
Id. at 607.

50 See Arnold B. Silverman, To Err is Human:
PatentReissues and the Doctrine ofIntervening
Rights, 48 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 696 (1966). Correction of errors is "allowed in the
interest of protecting the patentee from inequitable forfeiting rights." See Platt, supra note 40, at
1031 n.4.
51 See supra text accompanying note 16. The PTO made a substantial overhaul of the patent
reissue procedure and guidelines in the late 1970s; specifically the PTO sought to "improve the
quality and reliability of issued patents." Janis, supra note 16, at 16 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 5588
(1977)). The new regulation, known as the Dann Amendments, paved the way for a more user
friendly system. Id. at 17-19. For example, reissue application files became open to the public, no
defect re-issues were permissible, and a public protest procedure came into place. Id. at 18. Some of
the decisions were perhaps too liberal and uncontrolled, however, by 1982 the PTO had eliminated
the no-defect reissue procedure and had scaled back on its former open-arm policy for public
protesting. Id. at 19.
52 550 F.2d 1277 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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In Orita, the patent application 53 was subjected to a restriction requirement. 54
Due to their failure to file a divisional application, the applicants tried to apply for a
reissue of their patent that would have, in effect, added four claims substantially
identical to their non-elected claims. 55 The applicants explained their error was
made without deceptive intent, 56 but the court found the alleged error was not the
type of error reissue was meant to address. 57 Further, the court found that the
copendency requirement of Section 12058 was incorporated in Section 12159.60 The
statutes required an applicant who wished to have the benefit of an earlier filing
date, despite canceling claims to meet an examiner's restriction requirement, to file a
divisional application.61 To allow a reissue in this particular case would circumvent
62
this copendency requirement.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") echoed the
holding in Orita63 in their review of In re Weiler,6 4 where the applicants failed to
timely file a divisional application for the non-elected claims.6 5 There, the Federal
53The patent included claims 1-4 to compounds and a method for their preparation. Id. at
1277. Dependant claims 5-8 included a color-developable coating composition, an emulsion, and a
coated sheet, such that these latter claims shared a compound of generic claim 1. Id. at 1278. The
examiner required that the applicants limit their claims to one invention per application as codified
in Section 251 of the Patent Act. Id. The applicant's counsel elected claims 1-4 and preserved the
right to traverse the examiner's restriction but it was never perfected, thus, the applicants filed an
application for reissue. Id. at 1278-79.
54See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application,
the Commissioner may require the application to be restricted to one of the
inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application
which complies with the requirements of section 120 of this title it shall be
entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application.
Id.
55 Id.

5( Pursuant to 37 CFR 1.175(a), the applicants for reissue must file a statement under oath or
declaration which includes: "(3) When it is claimed that such patent is inoperative or invalid 'by
reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent,' distinctly
specifying the excess or insufficiency in the claims."
57 Orita,550 F.2d at 1280.
58 See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
59See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000).
60 Orita,550 F.2d at 128081.
61 35 U.S.C. § 121.
62 Orita, 550 F.2d at 1281. The court was quite unsympathetic to the applicant's arguments,
explaining that '[s]ection 251 is not a panacea designed to cure every mistake which might be
committed by an applicant or his attorney, and the case at bar exemplifies a mistake which this
section cannot cure." Id.
63 Id. at 1280 (holding acquiescence to an examiner's requirement for restriction is not an error
correctable by reissue).
(34
790 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The original patent application filed contained eleven
claims, and the examiner held that there were actually "three independent and distinct inventions."
Id. at 1578. A section 121 restriction requirement was effected between Claims 1-7 (assay method),
Claims 8 and 11 (an "organic compound," and Claims 9 and 10 ('a protein compound"). Id.
( Id. at 1578-79. Claim 1 was the independent claim and dependant claims 2-7 followed.
These claims compromised the original patent, "Method for Quantitative Analysis for Limonin."
Claim 1 read:
A method of quantitative analysis of limonin which comprises reacting a known
amount of limonin-specific antibodies, with a mixture of a known volume of
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Circuit provided a clearer analysis for determining whether a correctable error was
present, and required that in the original patent, there must be an "intent to claim" 66
67
the matter that the applicant now asserts is the error at the heart of the reissue.
68
This was the requirement the Board found lacking in the Weiler's original patent.
Consequently, although "error" is interpreted liberally, no error correctable by
reissue was present.69 The applicant was wrong to apply for reissue. 70
Another reissue applicant challenged the Board's denial of an application in In
re Watkinson.7 1 Watkinson argued that the error in the original patent was her
sample containing an unknown amount of limonin and a known amount of a
limonin-derivative labeled with an enzyme or with a radioactive isotope,
determining the amount of labeled limonin-derivative which has reacted with said
antibodies and calculateing therefrom the unknown amount of limonin in said
sample.
Id. at 1578.
The two rejected claims in the reissue patent application were claims 13 and 19. Id. at 1579.
Claim 13 read: "A method for developing citrus fruit strains low in limonin content, which method
comprises identifying by the use of limonin-specific antibodies as a analytical reagent the limoninlow mutants in a breeding or cell culture program, and propagating said mutants." Id. at 1578.
Claim 19 reads: "A gamma globulin fraction comprising antibodies reactive with limonin, said
antibodies being formed consequent to injecting into an animal a limonin-protein conjugate." Id. at
1578-79.
66 See id. at 1581 (noting that although 'intent to claim' does not appear in the statute[,] ... [i]t
is but judicial shorthand, signifying a means of measuring whether the statutorily required urr'is
present"); see also In -reRowand, 526 F.2d 558, 560 (C.C.P.A.) (explaining that where there is no
disclosure of a method for making the tubing in the original patent, there is no intent to claim a
method; thus, it is proper to reject a reissue application for a lack of evidence in the original patent
showing an intent to claim the subject matter that the applicants now assert to be their invention).
67 Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1582 ("If it were not error to forego divisional applications on subject
matter to which claims had been made in the original application, it cannot on the present record
have been error to forego divisional applications on subject matter to which claims had never been
made").
68 The Board had found that the subject matter of the claims at issue "was not claimed at all in
the original application ... nothing in the patent evidenced an 'intent to claim' that subject matter."
Id. at 1580.
69 1d. at 1582. The court notes in its analysis that the "error" to be corrected by reissue is not a
subjective error like "deceptive intention." Id. at 1583 n.4. Weiler argued that he was ignorant of
the drafting and claiming requirements while his counsel was ignorant of the invention, which
resulted in his failure to claim the subject matter of the claims at issue; however, the court rejected
the argument. Id. The Federal Circuit held that such allegations may be "frequently made, and if
accepted as establishing error, would require the grant of reissues on anything and everything
mentioned in a disclosure." Id.
70 Moreover, although the Patent Act provides a variety of methods to correct issued patents,
the court had to discourage applicants from scrambling for any seemingly "wrongful" action during
their reissue application process. The court in Weiler suggested that "[i]nsight resulting from
hindsight on the part of new counsel does not, in every case, establish error." Id.
71 900 F.2d 230 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Board found that the case was in line with Orita in that
there was a deliberate choice to file a divisional application and a subsequent failure to file such a
divisional. Id. at 231. The original application by Watkinson was "directed to compositions for and
methods of inhibiting the growth of timber fungus." Id. During prosecution, the examiner subjected
the application to a restriction requirement, and Watkinson elected the claims within Group I and
cancelled the remaining non-elect claim 38. Id. at 230-31. Upon filing an application for reissue of
the Group I patent to include claims 36-38 corresponding to the cancelled claim 38, the examiner
rejected all the claims for reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) because there was no finding of error.
Id. at 231 (observing a similar argument in Orita for the principle that reissue applicants are
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acquiescence to a restriction requirement in the original application.72 The court
held that there was no error because Watkinson should have "challenged the merits
of the restriction requirement in the original application during the prosecution of
73
the original application."
Although the CCPA defined the analysis in Orita, it was not until Doyle that the
Federal Circuit actually had a chance to review a lower court's interpretation of the
Orita doctrine and thus determine its proper applicability.

II. ANALYSIS

A.

The OriginalPatent andProceduralHistory ofIn re Doyle

In Doyle, the inventor, Dr. Michael Doyle, discovered a genus of chiral transition
metal catalysts7 4 and a method involving the use of this genus of catalysts to perform
enantioselective reactions. 75 On September 24, 1992, Dr. Doyle filed a patent
application claiming his invention.7 6 The examiner imposed a nine-way restriction
requirement on the grounds that the application was attempting to claim nine
different inventions, 77 and consequently, Dr. Doyle elected group VI only.7 8 Group VI
consisted of method claims directed towards using the chiral transition metal

estopped from obtaining claims that they could not claim in their original patent because they
acquiesced to a requirement for restriction); see Orita,550 F.2d at 1280.
72 Id.; see also Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1576, 1582 (holding that cancelled claims could not be
reissued upon no finding of error); Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("The recapture rule bars the patentee from acquiring, through reissue, claims that are of the same
or of broader scope than those claims that were canceled from the original application").
7:3Watkinson, 900 F.2d at 233. The court could not have undergone the review of the
examiner's restriction requirement that Watkinson demanded because "neither this court nor the
board has jurisdiction in this proceeding to review the merits of a requirement for restriction under
Section 121, as a restriction requirement is a matter within the discretion of the examiner and not
tantamount to a rejection of claims." Id. The court in Watkinson admonished the applicant's
attempt to file an application for a patent reissue when the proper procedure would have been to
challenge the restriction immediately. Id.
74Chiral molecules have one or more chiral centers, which are centers to which different
chemical groups may attach to form different compounds. -d. The relative arrangements of the
molecular structure are known as stereoisomers. Id. at 1356 n.1. A chiral molecule has a mirror
image structure, its enantiomer, such that the two structures cannot be superimposed and have
different properties. -d. at 1356. Scientists requiring only one structure would have to find some
way to manufacture the sole variation of the molecule desired, or alternatively, attain a mixture of
the enantiomers with the preferential result that the desired structure makes up a significantly
large percentage of the mix with only a few isolated molecules of other disfavored structures. Id. In
pharmaceutical chemistry, enantioselective reactions have this precise function of producing a
heightened quantity of only one structure of a target compound selected for its specific
pharmacological properties. Id.
75 Id.

76 U.S. Patent No. 5,296,595 (issued March 22, 1994).
77Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1356.
78 Id.
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catalysts to insert carbenes 79 into carbon-hydrogen, oxygen-hydrogen, nitrogenhydrogen, and silicon-hydrogen bonds. 8 0 The other claims in the initial patent
applications were cancelled.81 No divisional applications were filed and the patent,
U.S. Patent No. 5,296,595, issued on March 22, 1994.82
Nearly two years later, on February 14, 1996, Dr. Doyle sought to broaden his
patent and filed a request for reissue.8 3 The proposed reissue genus claims covered
the reaction of his catalysts with a genus of prochiral molecules.8 4 This change would
effectively include the already claimed reactions of the catalysts with the insertion of
carbenes and "read on" 85 the claims of the non-elected Groups VIJ-IX. 86 The
79See id.at 1356 n.3 ('A carbene is a CR2 fragment, where R represents a group bonded to the
carbon atom.").
80 Id.at 1356.
81 Id. At this stage of the prosecution history, a patentee has the opinion to file divisional
applications for the remaining non-elected claims, but here, Dr. Doyle did not attempt to do so. Id.
82 U.S. Patent No. 5,296,595 (issued March 22, 1994).
83 Dr. Doyle explained his reasoning for reissue:
the 595 patent is partially defective because the claims are narrower than they
should be in view of the 595 patent's disclosure and the prior art. In particular,
all 53 claims of the 595 patent are drawn to a method of enantioselectively
inserting a carbene with a chiral catalyst. I now believe that the claims should
have been broader in order to cover the use of the defined catalyst to
enantioselectively catalyze reactions with a prochiral compound.
Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1357.
81 See id. at 1356 n.2, ('A prochiral compound is one that, while not yet chiral, can become so
when it undergoes a chemical transformation").
85 Id.; see also CHISUM, sup-ra note 3, at Glossary (defining a claim that "reads on" as one that
"covers products or processes that contain all of the elements and limitations of the claim. In
determining the coverage of a claim, it is not construed or applied by literal language alone;
consideration is given to the prior art and the description of the invention in the specification");
Landis on the Mechanics of Claim Drafting, Practising Law Institute, § 18, n.5 (2000) ("each
technical phrase in the claim must literally describe a corresponding element or connection, etc.,
found in the description").
86 Proposed claim 54 is illustrative of the other reissue claims:
A method of enantioselectively catalyzing a reaction comprising the steps of'.
providing a prochiral compound, providing a chiral catalyst comprising a nucleus
with a first and second atom of the same metal aligned on an axis, said metal
selected from the group consisting of rhodium, ruthenium, chromium,
molybdenum, tungsten, rhenium and osmium; and first, second, third and fourth
bridging ligands oriented radially to the axis, each ligand having a first and
second complexing atom, the first complexing atom of each of said bridging
ligands being complexed with said first metal atom, and the second complexing
atom of each of said bridging ligands being complexed to said second metal atom,
said first bridging ligand further comprising a ring including said first complexing
atom and attached to said second complexing atom, said ring also including a
chiral center attached through a first bonding site to said first complexing atom,
attached through a second bonding site to said ring, having a third bonding site
occupied by a first substituent, and having a fourth bonding site occupied by a
second substituent, and said second bridging ligand further comprising a ring
including said second complexing atom and attached to said first complexing atom,
said ring also including a chiral center attached through a first bonding site to
said second complexing atom, attached through a second bonding site to said ring,
having a third bonding site occupied by a first substituent, and having a fourth
bonding site occupied by a second substituent, and wherein the R/S configuration
of the chiral center on the second bridging ligand is the same as the R/S
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examiner approved claims 1-53 for the reissue but refused to allow claims 54 through
71.8 7 The rejection was based on two main grounds: failure to specify an error
correctable by reissue and the doctrine of recapture.8 8 Dr. Doyle appealed the lack of
error finding and the applicability of the doctrine of recapture.8 9 The Board agreed
with the examiner that there was a lack of error, 90 but did not sustain the rejection
under the doctrine of recapture. 91 The Board ruled that the recapture doctrine,
which prevents an applicant from claiming through reissue any matter that had been
surrendered to overcome a rejection based on prior art, was inapplicable because
Doyle's new claims were not canceled to overcome prior art, rather, the claims were
92
canceled to overcome a restriction requirement.
Both the examiner and the Board based their decisions about the missing
correctable error on the Orita doctrine; 93 the proposed claims 54-71 of the patent
reissue request could not be granted because the Orita doctrine precludes a reissue
applicant from obtaining claims that read on to the non-elected groups when these
94
proposed claims could have been prosecuted in a divisional application.

B. Affirming the Doyle Court'sAnalysis of OtherReissue Cases
In Doyle, the issue was whether a failure to present a linking claim, 9 5 that is, a
claim broad enough to "read on" or link two or more groups of claims subject to a
restriction requirement, is an error correctable by reissue according to the Patent
Act.96 This was an issue of first impression for the Federal Circuit. 97 Although the
Board had affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 54-71 based on the Orita
doctrine, 98 the Federal Circuit in Doyle found the Board's interpretation of Or ta too

configuration of the chiral center on the first bridging ligand, and reacting said
prochiral compound and said chiral catalyst under conditions sufficient [sic, to]
cause the reaction.
Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1357.
87 Id.; see also Exparte Doyle, No.2000-0601, 2000 WL 33118610, at *2 (Bd. Pat. App & Interf.

Dec. 29, 2000), request for reh'T denied (Mar. 22, 2001).
88 Exparte Doyle, 2000 WL 33118610, at *2-3.
89 Id. at *2.
90 Id. at *3-5.
The Board conceded with Doyle that the appealed reissue claims are not
identical to the non-elected claims of the original application; however, the Board was persuaded
that the proposed claims "nevertheless encompass the subject matter of each of the canceled, nonelected claims," and that was sufficient to bar the reissue. Id. at *34. Furthermore, the Board
believed that granting a reissue for this type of linking claim would "circumvent the copendency
requirement of Section 120 incorporated by reference in Section 251." Id. at *5.
91Id. at *56.
92 Id.

See generally Orita, 550 F.2d 1277.
See ExparteDoyle, 2000 WL 33118610, at *2-5.
95 See MPEP,supra note 5, § 809.03 (2001) ("Linking claims"); see also MPEP,supra note 5, §
809.04 ("Retention of Claims to Non-elected Invention').
9 Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1359.
97 Id.
98 See generally Orita, 550 F.2d 1277.
93

94
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expansive. 99
The court distinguished Orita 100 and
°3
102
Watklnson'0 and Weiler, and reversed the Board.1

its

progeny,

including

1. The Theory ofEstoppel
I °4
The Court held that the theory of estoppel, at the heart of the Oria doctrine
asserted by the Board, was not successful in arguing against the reissue. 105 The
rationale for estoppel is to prevent the holder of a patent from trying to claim aspects
of an invention that were purposely excluded from a patent application so that a
patent could be approved and issued by the PTO.
As the rational for estoppel did not apply, Doyle's reissue application was
distinguishable from earlier cases that precluded from reissue claims under the Orita
doctrine. 106 The court also looked at Watkinison, where Watkinson expressly
acquiesced to the restriction and cancelled the non-elected claims. 107 Watkinson was
estopped in her reissue application because she was bound to her original decision to
cancel the claims. 108 However, Doyle "did not assert the reissue claims" exactly or in
a similar form in his original application and "also never agreed to prosecute the
reissue claims in a divisional application." 10 9

A further contention by the Court was that not only could Doyle assert these
claims in his reissue, but pursuant to JIIPEP § 809.04,110 "these linking claims . . .
should
uhave
been prosecuted with the elected group. ' '

99See Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1361. "[T]he rationale underlying In re Orita and the holding of that
case extend only to claims that are identical to or of substantially similar scope to those of the nonelected group" and does not preclude broadening claims which read on non-elected subject matter.
Id. (emphasis added).
100 See Orita, 550 F.2d 1277.
101 900 F.2d 230.
102 790 F.2d 1576.
103 Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1364.
104 See also Watkinson, 900 F.2d 230. Watkinson was the only Federal Circuit case to apply
the Orita doctrine prior to Doyle.
105 See generally T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and the Scope ofPatents, 13 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 465, 514-19 (2000) (comparing the
historical basis of doctrine of recapture and estoppel in the context of reissues and discussing the
present day effects of these doctrines).
106See Orita, 550 F.2d 1277.
107 See Watkinson, 900 F.2d at 232.
108Id.

109Doyle, 293 F.2d at 1360.

110 Soe MPEP,supra note 5, § 809.4. For the retention of claims to non-elected inventions, the
MPEPprovides that "[i]f a linking claim is allowed, the examiner must thereafter examine species if
the linking claim is generic thereto, or he or she must examine the claims to the non-elected
inventions that are linked to the elected invention by such allowed linking claim." Id.
111 Doyle, 293 F.2d at 1360-62 (recognizing that if Doyle had declared the linking claim during
the initial prosecution of his patent, "the examiner would have been required to lift the restriction
requirement as to the other groups linked by the new claims and allow prosecution of those other
groups").

[2:360 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

2. The Scope of the Reissue Claims
Another aspect that distinguished Wat]-izison from Doyie was that while Doyle
could have prosecuted his broader reissue claims in his original patent, 112
Watkinson's patent reissue attempt failed because she had already tried to make the
exact claims in her original patent application.1 1 3 In Doyle's first attempt to claim
his discoveries, the claims covered too many aspects of the inventions.11 4 After the
restriction, the claims did not cover enough of the invention. 115 Thus, Doyle could
have successfully claimed the middle ground in the original patent, and the board
11 6
should have allowed the modified claims in the reissue declaration.
Doyle was entitled'1 7 to a reissue "by reason of [Dr. Doyle] claiming ... less than
he had a right to claim in the patent" pursuant to Section 251 of the Patent Act. 11s
The court also found that the correctable error in Dojyle was distinguishable from
Orita, because the patent issued in Orita contained no errors at all,11 9 rather, the
120
applicant had claimed exactly what he intended to claim.

The court also found that Doyle was distinguishable from Weiler because the
Weiler concerned a bar against reissue claims that did not have a showing of "intent
to claim" in the original application.121 Thus, Weiler's new claims were a separate
12 3
invention, 122 while Doyle's new claims read on the elected group.
Consequently, the Orita doctrine isapplicable only to claims "identical to or of
substantially similar scope to those of the non-elected group." 124 Comparatively,
Doyle's linking claims were "significantly broader" than the species claims of the nonelected groups, and are "obviously not of substantially similar scope as the nonelected species claimed" 125 although the subject matter is the same as the issued
patent.126

Id.

112

113See Watkinson, 900 F.2d at 231.
114Doyle, 293

F.3d at 1358.

"15Id.

11;Id.
117 The granting of a reissue pursuant to Section 251 depends on how the courts construe the

statute. It is a long held understanding that the reissue statute is "remedial in nature, based on the
fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be construed liberally." In re Weiler, 790
F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
118 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000); Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1360 ("In re Orita does not - and cannot limit his statutory right to seek reissue under the circumstances").
11) Orita, 550 F.2d at 1280.
120Id. ("Patentee claimed exactly what they had a right to claim in the patent, no more nor
less, and the appellant's failure to timely re-file does not change this fact").
121 See Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1362; see also Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1580.
122 Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1581.
123

Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1363.

124 Id.

at 1361.

125 Id.

12(6
The claims in the reissue declaration are broader, however, the claims may not be so broad
as to introduce new matter since no new matter can be introduced in the reissue declaration. See 35
U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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3. CopendeneyArgument
The Federal Circuit had two reasons for rejecting the Board's argument that
permitting linking claims by reissues will offset the statutory provisions of the
copendency requirements in sections 120127 and 121128 of the Patent Act and thus
adversely affect "the public interest in the certainty and finality of patent rights. " 129
First, the court held that Dojie does not concern the two statutes because the matter
sought on reissue was not subject to a restriction requirement and could have been
presented with the original application.1 30 Second, the court found Doyle's situation
"no more an affront to the public interest than any other broadening reissue."131

4. DivisionalApplications versus BroadeningReissues
The other public interest argument made by the PTO Solicitor, that Doyle had
dedicated the subject matter of his linking claims to the public by failing to file a
divisional application 32 on the non-elected groups, also failed. 133 The Federal Circuit
justified the reissue as part of Doyle's "right to exclude. " 134 Moreover, the reissue
statutes put the public on notice1 35 for any infringement from the time between the
issue of the original patent and the granting of the reissue by way of statutory
136
intervening rights.
12735 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (requiring that an earlier filing date is granted when a continuation
or divisional application is filed "before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of
proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the [first]
filing date ....
").
128 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000) (providing for divisional applications).
129 Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1363.

1:30
Id.
131Id.

("Congress has weighed the benefits and burdens of allowing corrections of this sort of
error by reissue, and has decided to allow broadening reissues, subject, of course, to certain
safeguards: the two year time limitation and intervening rights."); see also J. Christopher Carraway,
The Uncertain Future of Enforcing Patents That Have Been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED.
CIR. B.J. 63, 70-75 (1998) (discussing the conflict of broadening reissues with the public notice and
encouraging design around claims).
132While Doyle did not file a divisional application prior to his reissue application, he must file
a terminal disclaimer to get the reissued patent. Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1358, n.4. Otherwise, a conflict
of obviousness-type double patenting would be created in reissue claims that are not distinct from
the original patent. In re Londaro, 119 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
133So Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1364.
IM

Id.

The public is therefore on notice that at least some [subject] matter can be
"dedicated to the public" in error and that the error, if caught in time, can be
corrected by reissue .... [1]f the patentee succeeds in obtaining a reissue that
alters the scope of her right to exclude, then the public interest is protected
through intervening rights.
Id. The right to exclude is a right recognized by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1363.
IN See id. Reissues have the benefit of the same filing date as the original patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 251, 2 (2000). Thus, members of the public who were not infringers at the time of the
patent issue may suddenly find themselves to be infringers once the reissue is granted. See id.n.5
(quoting Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985), for
the proposition that "when certain conditions are present a reissue shall not abridge or affect certain
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Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reversed the ruling of the Board to reject the
13
pending claims and remanded for further proceedings. 7

C. The Effect of the Allowing Linking Claims by Reissue
Rulings in Orita, Weiler, Watkinson, and most recently, Doyle, have clarified
and perhaps even expanded the former regime of patent reissues. In Doyle, the
Federal Circuit distinguished a number of prior cases, and in doing so, appears to
have expanded the application of broadening reissue. However, some questions yet
remain unanswered: for example, if an omission of a linking claim during a patent's
prosecution history is an error correctable by reissue, does policy suggest that the two
year limitation on broadening reissues should also apply to attempts to link
claims? 1 3 8

Also, the Orita doctrine was understood by both the reissue application

examiner and the Board to mean that any failure to file a divisional claim was not an
error correctable by reissue, are there any other situations that could potentially
draw more reissue applications to the PTO now that failure to assert a linking claim
has been distinguished from a simple failure to file a divisional application?
Patent drafters learned the important skill of wording claims.

139

But ultimately,

the patentee must retain a sizable stake in the claims for the purpose of retaining an
exclusive right against the world. 140 The question that the larger picture poses is
whether the grant of reissue claims to the genus of non-elected claims is consistent
with the procedures and goals of the patent system.

rights of those who acted before the reissue was granted."). Intervening rights play an important
function because broadening reissues are liberally granted pursuant to the longstanding practice of
"constru[ing] [reissue] liberally." See -In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Increasing

ways to apply for broadening reissues presumably increases the likelihood of infringement by the
members of the public.
137 Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1364.
138 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (2000) (providing for a two-year statute of limitation on filing
reissue applications and on recovery under the doctrine of intervening rights).
139 See 1 PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 2:2 (2002).
Claim structure consists of a
preamble, transition statement and a body, and form a single sentence with a single period. Id. The
ideal claim is neither too broad, nor too narrow, and the invention is clearly and adequately
described so that novelty and nonobviousness with respect to all prior art are present.
110 See Kralovic, supra note 35, at 89-90 (suggesting that a tension is created between the
patentee and the public in achieving the "economically advantageous" balance of the patent system's

objectives, namely to reward and encourage inventors, and to disclose new technologies in the useful
arts to the public domain).

Ironically, while the economic consequences of a granted patent is

ultimately based on the ability to create a unique and distinguished market share for the invention,
the build-up to that position in the form of a patent or reissue application is a much more dependent
evaluation of prior art.
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III. PROPOSAL

A. The Statutory Treatment ofLinking Claims
The current U.S. Patent Act does not delineate the types or forms of error that
are correctable by reissue, however, Doyle has clearly shown that a failure to assert a
linking claim may be considered a section § 251 "error."141 Authorities such as the
Patent Office, which publishes the Manual of Patent Examination and Procedures,
and even Congress, 142 might consider revising the Patent Act to reflect the ongoing
development of law surrounding the granting of reissues.
For example, while the court did not have to decide in Doyle whether linking
claims correctable by reissue are likely subject to the two-year limitation on
broadening reissues,1 43 the lack of any language to the contrary suggests that the
same cut-off would apply. 144 Since the court has interpreted the Patent Act to allow
Doyle's particular omittance as "error" when the reissue claims read on to the nonelected claims, thus broadening the original claim, Congress should clarify if it is
indeed their intent to place a time limit on the inclusion of the subject matter of non145
elected claims.
As Doyle inferred, the policy of broadening reissue supports such a limitation in
the interest of the patent's holder's right to claim no more and no less, than what was
discovered.1 46 But the court made no finding that the interest of the patent holder is
141 While both the Patent Act under Title 35 of the United States Code and authoritative
patent law guides such as the MPEPdescribe linking claims and its applications in claim drafting to
some extent, not all countries with patent systems permit the use of linking claims. For example, in
the Canadian patent system, linking claims are specifically discouraged and not authorized. See,

e.g., The CanadianPatent Office Manual of Patent Office Practice, § 14.04.01, (1998), available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/patents/mopop/ch14-e.pdf
(last visited February 3, 2003)
(showing that linking claims are categorized under "Unacceptable Claim Groupings"). For example,
where "Claim 1 to the combination of A, B and C; Claim 2 to the combination of E, F and G; Claim 3
to the combination of C, D and E; claim 3 . . . does not justify the inclusion of unrelated
subcombinations in one application." d. Section 36(1) of the Canadian Patent Act (R.S., c. P-4) and
Section 36 of the Canadian Patent Rules (P.C. 1996-1350 28 August, 1996) requires a restriction. Id.
142 The Federal Circuit mentions Congress twice in the Doyle opinion. The first reference is in
an argument discussing the "benefits and burdens" on broadening reissues. Doyle, 293 F.2d at 1363.
In the second reference, which was in response to the PTO Solicitor's concern about the inadequacy
of public notice if new linking claims were allowed by reissue, the court directs that if the statutory
rights are "insufficient[,]" then "the remedy lies with Congress." Id. at 1364.
113 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 (2000).
144 Judge Learned Hand long ago expressed his opinion of the relation between reissue and
public notice when he expressed that public notice is an important aspect of granting reissue. Otis
Elevator Co. v. Atl. Elevator Co., 47 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir. 1931); see also Janicke, supra note 37,
at 33.
145 A close reading of the court's opinion in Doyle shows that while the court disagreed with the
solicitor's argument that there is a lack of public notice for allowing linking claims that read on to
non-elected claims, the court itself took no firm position on whether policy gives the court discretion
to allow for greater consideration of public notice over that of the patent holder. 293 F.3d at 1364.
Rather, the court silently points to the current statutory controls such as the statute of limitation.

Id.
146 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000) (allowing a reissue to be granted if the reason underlying the
reissue is that the patentee claimed "more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent"). Cf

[2:360 2003]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

greater than the interest of public notice. 147 Statistically, reissue patent grants are
increasing as the total number of patent grants increases, but there is no indication
that there is a flux of reissue applicants flooding the system. 148 There is ample room
to expand reissue procedures. Consequently, it is likely that Congress will agree that
a reissue should be granted to correct the error of failing to make a linking claim. If
Congress' position is that public notice is not adequately protected by allowing this
type of error to be corrected, a clarification now would ensure that little or no
litigation would reach finality based on the court's current presumption of
congressional intentions.
Furthermore, the PTO and Congress may look to the current reissue
applications in the system and determine if there any other situations similar to a
failure to assert a linking claim that may be categorically distinguished from the noncorrectable failure to file a divisional application. However, a list delineating specific
149
correctable errors by reissue is highly unlikely since error is liberally construed.

B. Pollcy Arguments for the Promotion ofStrategic Safeguards for the Patent
Holder:DivisionalApplications and Reissues
In the early years of the patent system, there were severe consequences when a
patentee surrendered a patent for a reissue. 150 A patent holder today, however, has a
large supporting framework to relinquish a patent. 151 A goal of the patent system is

Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1361 (holding that Doyle correctly identified an error in his existing patent as the
"failure to claim as broadly as possible matter that could have been sought in the original
application"). Thus, in the original patent, Doyle satisfies Section 251 by claiming less than he had
a right to claim.
147 Doyle, 293 F.3d at 1363 (the court clarified its position and effectively refused to act as a
superlegislature by emphasizing that "[the court] may not rewrite the statute based on our own view
of the proper outcome of that public policy debate"). Judge Clevenger's opinion of Doyle is a detailed
and careful analysis to distinguish earlier cases. There is no doubt that the Federal Circuit desired
greater definiteness in the application of the Orita doctrine, where in severe cases, the cost of a
denial of a reissue could mean losing parts of an invention to the public domain.
148 "Reissue Patents: January 1977 to December 2001." U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
April 2002, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reissues.pdf, (last visited
February 2, 2003). From 1988 to 1998, the number of U.S. origin patents granted annually ranged
from a low of 244 to a high of 370. Id. at 4. Since 1999, the number of patents granted has
increased: 448 in 1999, 524 in 2000, and 480 in 2001. Id.
119 A main feature of the reissue process that the Federal Circuit repeatedly points out in
reissue cases is that the "reissue statute, 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000), is remedial in nature, based on
principles of equity and fairness, and should be liberally construed." In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 809
(Fed. Cir. 1988); see also In -reWeiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A listing of correctable
errors would only limit the freedom of the PTO and the court system to grant reissues since
currently, the determination of error is largely built up through case law.
150 Prior to 1928, a reissued patent, once granted, would "abate[] all causes of action and all
suits based on the original patent." CHISUM, supra note 3, § 15.05[]. Thus, the patent holder who
discovers a mistake must take a gamble: should a mistake in the original patent be quickly amended
before an infringer can spot the loophole in the patent and design around it, or should the patent
holder speedily conclude or terminate all suits before the reissue is granted?
151 Fortunately, by the late 1920s, Congress expressed its intention "to ameliorate the harsh
effect of a patent's surrender" and adopted the rule that pending action and causes of action can
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to allow the patent holder a patent that truly reflects the invention claimed even if it
requires multiple reissue grants. 152 The grant of reissue claims to the genus of nonelected claims is consistent with the ideals of the patent system 153 and technology as
154
it stands today.
Compared with the tools available in the early 1800s when the patent system
was first forming, today's science and technology requires significantly less research
and development time to gather accurate and complex data about chemical
structures and precision calculations.1 55 Meanwhile, both Congress and the courts
are taking proper steps to ensure that the rights of the patent holder continue to
expand to reflect the changing times. The language, terms, and scientific categories
to which claims are drafted today, especially in the field of biotechnology, allows the
patent drafter specificity in claiming an invention. However, a basic tenant of
scientific classification is that some categories overlap or are subsets within a set.
This lack of a bright line classification system may be a weakness when applied to
determining the scope of a patent. When patent applicants draft claims using these
categorical schemes, 156 the patent system also becomes susceptible to the same
weakness of categorization.
In allowing corrections to be made so that broader, linking claim may be
inserted, the court in Doyle essentially recognized that this weakness in scientific
categorization occasionally leads to confusion and mistakes in legal drafting.
Essentially, the patent holder was a scientist who looked at the smaller picture first,
157
before realizing that a large picture might have been claimed.

C Is There Already A Sufficient Remedy Available to PatentHolders?
A potential counterargument to the Doyle decision is that the availability of a
divisional application already provides a sufficient remedy for the patent holder who
stand "to the extent that the claims of the original and reissued patents are identical." Howes v.
Medical Components, Inc., 814 F.2d 638, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
152 This comports with a basic premise behind the reissue procedure: even when the reissue
applicant chooses to reject or abandon the applicant, the original patent always "remains in full
force." 35 U.S.C. § 252, 1 (2000).
153 A reissue patent is a powerful process in that the reissue claims may be enforced against
infringers in a number of litigations throughout the lifetime of the patent. Allan G. Altera,
Expanding the Reissue Procedure.A Better Way to do Business, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 205-06
(1993) (discussing the advantages of the reissue procedures and how the reissue framework can be
ameliorated and expanded so that the archaic doctrine of equivalents may be abolished).
154 The Doyle decision suggests the Federal Circuit believes that allow linking claims to
broaden the scope of the patent is a reasonable type of correctable error under the traditional liberal
interpretation of the reissue statutes.
155 Of course, one could argue that while the tools have improved, the problems have gotten
tougher as well.
156 Even "genus" and "species," terms of art in patent law, are borrowed from terms of art from
scientific classification methods.
157 A good analogy is a discovery made under the microscope in which a scientist places a fly
under a microscope and maneuvers the coarse focus knob up and down while looking at the
specimen. The scientist may describe every part of every inch of the fly, but fail to state that it is a
fly even though that was the obvious discovery. This form of mistake, under the Doyle ruling, is
considered an inadvertent mistake correctable by reissue.
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encounters a restriction requirement; thus, allowing a reissue for a failure to link
claims is unnecessarily burdensome to the patent system. This argument fails,
however, because it focuses on the patent system as a whole. 158 As the Doyle court
explained, the focus should be on the claims of the original patent to determine if the
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reissue claims could have been granted in the original.
The rights of the patentee should not be considered in terms of a tradeoff against
the public's benefit in getting the best mode and description of the invention in the
specification. The patent system is a balance of promises; the promise to the public
that scientific advances will be revealed in detail and the promise to the patent
holder that what is discovered can be protected. Thus, it is proper to permit a
patentee to claim what was discovered even if it requires a second, third, or nth draft
and, therefore, takes more time than a divisional application would allow. The right
to a reissue is fundamental to the operation and goals of the patent system, and it is
justified that the reissue procedure should allow multiple methods to make
corrections that achieve this end.

III. CONCLUSION
The goal of the patent system is to provide a patent holder the right to excluded
others from making, using, and selling the patented invention in the United States.
The reissue process and procedure recognizes the sometimes fallible and difficult
nature of patent drafting and patent issuance and strives to strike a balance between
the patentee's and the public interests in correcting oversights and mistakes. The
criteria upon which the PTO examiners and Board base their rejection of reissue
applications are effectively narrowed by the decision of Doyle. Reissue claims to the
genus of non-elected claims are permissible, and the Oritadoctrine cannot be used to
preclude the reissue claims for this type of failure to link claims.
The impact of the Doyle holding is not likely to be all that large. 160 However,
because Doyle broadens the rights of patent holders, the holders of currently valid
patents issued in the past two years are well advised to revisit their files of
prosecution history and take a second look at their non-elected claims and consider
applying for a reissue.

158 One could say this type of argument is better made to the legislature. See Doyle, 293 F.3d
at 1363-64.

159
Id. at

1360.

In 2002, there was only one reported "improper broadening" case in the United States court
system and the alleged infringer prevailed. "Patstat.org." University of Houston Law Center,
Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law, available at http://www.patstats.org, (last
visited February 01, 2003). In 2001, there were five cases of "improper broadening" that went to
trial: two cases were at the trial court level and ended at summary judgment; one reached final
judgment at the trial court; and two cases went to the appellate level and were affirmed. Id. In
2000, there were no "improper broadening" cases. Id.
1

